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Introduction.  
 
   In this paper, we want to briefly introduce a new concept, the dire need of which seems to 
be dictated by current parallel evolutions seen in technology and in the humanities. As 
theoretical questions are embedded in concrete objects (what we call “artifactualization”) 
they’re passing from the realm of traditional disciplines to an industrial or hyperindustrial 
world - as French philosopher Bernard Stiegler1 puts it. What exactly is artifactualization? 
Why is it needed? Previous concepts already seem to dwell in the same territory. However, 
their precise domain of application might call for a broader alternative. Let’s first analyze two 
of them before we get back to artifactualization: remediation and thingification.  
 
Remediation (Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin) 
 
   About a decade ago, Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin2 coined the concept of 
remediation to help us to get rid of the fascination for the new raised by digital technologies 
such as video games or the World Wide Web. Arguing against the claim that new medias 
require radically new forms of representations, the authors concentrate on visual media and 
show that from perspective painting to photography, cinema to televisions, newspapers to 
WebPages, all can be understood as borrowing strong influence from earlier medias; earlier 
medias reshaping posterior ones, and vice-versa, in a constant loop (“remediation” being a 
never ending transitive process).  
 
Thingification. 
 
   However fruitful this approach might prove, it still rests on the much debated notion of 
representation, one that is largely questionable in an age, as Scoot Lash and Celia Lury puts it 
in their book Global Cultural Industry: the Mediation of Things3, of “thingification”. By 
thingification, both authors aim to capture the shift from an understanding of the 
commoditization of culture where cultural industry was still conceived as a matter of 
symbolic superstructure albeit driven by profit-making and accumulation as befits a capitalist 
society – an analysis which dominated critical theory back to Adorno and Horkheimer’s 
Dialectic of Enlightenment4, to what they call “global cultural industry”. In this new context 
of ours, culture, under the guise of things, has become ubiquitous. Once a superstructure 
whose autonomous sphere threatened to yield to economical infrastructure, much to the 
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dismay of Adorno and Horkheimer, culture “takes on a certain materiality itself” and 
therefrom takes over infrastructure. While Bolter and Grusin analysis was eventually still 
limited to visual representations, Lash and Lury rightly see how images themselves as 
Deleuze puts it, have become “image-matter”5.  
 
   Yet, both conceptions suffer from the same prejudice: media as the point of departure of 
their analyses. Either media are remediating themselves (Bolter & Grusin) or things become 
media and media become things (Lash & Lury). Nowhere does this limitation comes under a 
brighter light than when Lash and Lury separate meaning, a fundamental aspect of 
representation for cultural industry, the means through witch the latter was mediated, from 
operationality: “When media become things, we enter a world of operationality, a world not 
of interpretation but of navigation.”  Our thesis is that we need a broader theory allowing us to 
understand how meaning itself is currently being operationalized.  
 
Artifactualization 
 
    The current digitization (of just about everything) isn’t tantamount to a dematerialization. 
It’s quite the contrary since issues that used to be – or seem - strictly theoretical now permeate 
debates and practices in computer science and engineering. Digitization is no 
dematerialization but a broader form of thingification that does not affect only culture, whose 
effects are felt in every conceivable aspect of human life. Thus, philosophical topics like 
language or ontologies are being “artifactualized”; in other words, they now give birth to 
digital artifacts. For example, thanks to tagging systems, computer ontologies or digital 
proper names like URIs – the building blocks of the Semantic Web, philosophical theories 
about meaning are reworked in the context of the Web6, re-thought and reshaped through 
design, in other words, re-created (or even simply created sometimes, see infra). Other 
examples include texts which lately have become cybertexts7 - that is, video games – eliciting 
controversial debates between narrativists and ludologists as regards the place of narration in 
a new technological context where it is widely challenged. Yet, artifactualisation doesn’t 
claim to be a uniform process, quite unlike the notion of applied science. Rather, every 
discipline and every period of time are concerned. It has already been made mention of the 
transition between texts and cybertexts. It could be argued, instead, that texts themselves were 
already the result of a technological evolution called grammatisation8 – long before the advent 
of computers. Hence, the former might well be artifacts themselves. Where artifactualisation 
does begin or end thus remains an open question, maybe the very first lesson to be drawn 
from this notion: more often than nought, artifactualisation is in fact re-artifactualisation, a 
shift from one kind of artifacts to another one9. 
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   Whereas meaning for philosophy of language is a topic of reflection, for engineers and 
computer scientists working on the Semantic Web, facing its so-called “Identity Crisis”10, the 
question can no longer retain the very same theoretical flavour. Concepts themselves aren’t 
understood as components of “thoughts”, as in Gottlob Frege’s landmark theory, one that 
shaped our understanding of language in the XXth century - or even Plato’s Ideas to take an 
extreme example of conceptual realism, waiting to be grasped, but as “resources”, properly 
coded and identified, in other words, operationnalized through technological means (namely, 
RDF, Resource Description Framework, and URIs, Uniform Resource Identifiers, arguably 
the two main components of the Semantic Web) – thus  also departing from more pragmatic 
approaches eager to put the emphasis solely on usages.  
 
   Tim Berners-Lee, founder of the World Wide Web in 1989, summarized his view in a 
widely quoted email: 
 
“we are not analyzing a world, we are building it. We are not experimental philosophers, we are 
philosophical engineers. We declare "this is the protocol". When people break the protocol, we lament, 
sue, and so on. But they tend to stick to it because we show that the system has very interesting and 
useful properties.”11 
 
   Following his remark, it no longer matters, for example, whether concepts do exist or not: 
only their coded “representation” is taken into account – as long as it doesn’t break the 
protocol, things are fine. While representation had to remain faithful to the thing represented, 
the criterion applied to something that was designed according to such and such principles 
isn’t faithfulness, an external criterion, but operationality, an internal one. In a sense, 
artifactualization is the opposite of William Morris’ makeshift12. While the latter borrowed 
from a pessimistic vision to explain why real objects were being gradually superseded by fake 
ones, artifactualization needs not reflect reality. Our own mythologies, the way we conceive 
of things rather than things themselves, suffice – provided the system works. It still deals with 
representations but ones that may have cut every imaginable bond to their objects; indeed, the 
latter need not even exist.  
    
   Whence the newly-acquired relevance of themes inherited from the humanities (inheritance 
was fundamental to remediation too), and especially philosophy, to the designing of artifacts 
such as computer ontologies, tagging systems or even the Semantic Web. It coincides with the 
advent of a new era where radically new usages are contrived out of very old topics. 
Heidegger was wrong to declare the end of Metaphysics. On rather, he was right, provided we 
understand that technology is giving a new digital flesh the old metaphysical project; a feat 
that is not the consequence of new discoveries but rather of meticulous design.  
 
Conclusion. 
 
   This transition has many consequences since artifacts are subject to material and industrial 
constrains, making them even more complex to comprehend. Just as philosophy imbues new 
areas and its concepts become “real” – though by design, the philosopher, in this new age of 
ubiquitous technologies, loses much of his prerogatives. Philosophy itself, once 
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artifactualized, ascends to reality and falls into oblivion at the same time for there are reasons 
to believe it loses itself in the process.  
